Security Council
Welcome from the Dias!

Esteemed Delegates,

My name is Diego Estévez and I hail from the sunny Caribbean, specifically the Dominican Republic. I am a junior at Universidad Iberoamericana (UNIBE) majoring in Business Administration, and I am currently pursuing a dual-degree in Montpellier Business School. As a devout MUNer for over six years (time does go by fast), I must confess that ever since I met MUN, I have been enchanted by the MUN spell, having taken part in over 20 conferences throughout the world and occupied roles in both the Academic and Organization team.

It is my most distinct pleasure to welcome you to Lyon MUN 2017, a conference which has set a lofty standard both academic and organization wise, nearly unmatched by any other conference in the region. I will be serving as a member of the Dias, alongside Mr. Petrikkos of the ever-intriguing United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during these 4 days. During the course of the sessions you will be faced by eminent threats to regional and international peace and security with a high-intensity, high-stakes debate with other active and engaged delegates.

I am entirely optimistic that this conference will be a substantive learning experience for all who partake and I eagerly anticipate the high quality of debate that will take place. It is in order to say that I am anxiously looking forward to meeting you all in May, and I hope you come prepared, excited and fraught with enthusiasm, skill, and ingenuity in order to delve into the heated debates and blistering atmosphere of Lyon MUN 2017.

Please note that the following background guide functions as a starting point for your research on the given topics assigned to this committee. In addition, we do not provide extensive information on your delegation’s positions on the matters of a debate, information that will be critical to your success. Approaches to the chosen issues may change between the drafting of this background guide and the conference, so please stay up-to-date with all of the latest developments.

Should you have any queries, do not hesitate to reach out to me via diegoestevezv@gmail.com. Again, it is with a great sense of pride that I welcome to Lyon MUN 2017 and the UNSC!

May the force be with you!

Diego Estévez Valdez  
Chair of the UNSC, Lyon MUN 2017
Dear Participants,

I am a finalist in International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London. As an avid MUNer since 2009, I have been involved in delegating, chairing, organising, press, and staffing various conferences.

My interests include security, conflict, intelligence, crisis management, and development. These interests, together with the conflict back home in Cyprus, have shaped and reshaped my MUN experience throughout the years. Although we are mere participants in a simulation, I genuinely believe that such experiences and conferences can help us grow as individuals, enhancing our critical thinking and debating skills, among others, helping us to shape better solutions for the future.

We hope this guide proves useful for our delegates, as a tool for delivering thought-provoking debates and successfully addressing the issues in question.

With that being said, I look forward to welcoming you to this year’s LyonMUN!

Best Regards,

Petros Petrikkos
Co-Chair of the UNSC, Lyon MUN 2017
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The United Nations Security Council Overview

Although States started establishing international organizations (many of which are now United Nations specialized agencies) on specific matters that would ensure the cooperation between them in 1865, first multilateral treaties that instruments for settling crises peacefully, preventing wars and codifying rules of warfare were signed and issued at the International Peace Conference in 1899.¹

The forerunner organization of United Nations, the League of Nations, was conceived during the First World War "to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security", however it terminated itself because of its failure to prevent Second World War.

When World War II showed the need for an effective international organization to arbitrate disputes, representatives of 50 countries met at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter and after many deliberations The United Nations (UN) officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States) and by a majority of other signatories.

The primary purposes of the United Nations were offered to be maintenance of international peace and security; and, to this end, taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and bringing about means of adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace. Other purposes can be listed as development of friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; achievement of international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems; and affordance of a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends. Thus, a General Assembly, a Security Council and an International Court of Justice were established in order to serve in accordance with these purposes.

Structure of the Security Council

Members of the Security Council

At its establishment in 1945, the Security Council was consisting of eleven member-states including the five permanent members; but later on, linked to the enlargement of the United Nations, the non-permanent members number was increased to ten, and accordingly number needed of in favor votes for adopting a resolution changed to nine in 1963.² Those ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two year terms (five each year); thus the election should be done accordingly to the pattern which was decided at the eighteenth session in resolution 1991 A (XVIII) as:

a) Five from African and Asian States;

b) One from Eastern European States;

c) Two from Latin American States;

d) Two from Western European and other States.

Today the Security Council welcomes the representatives of Bolivia (2018), Egypt (2017), Ethiopia (2018), Italy (2018), Japan (2017), Kazakhstan (2018), Senegal (2017), Sweden (2018), Ukraine (2017), and Uruguay (2017) as the non-permanent states with the five permanent members, which are People’s Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.³ Also a member-state of the UN may participate, without a vote; in the Council’s discussions when that country’s interests are affected; thus even a non-member state may be invited by the Council to take part in the debate without a vote, if they are parties to the dispute that is being considered by the Council.

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Voting: The Veto Rights

In the voting system, it is seen that there is a distinction between voting on the procedural and non-procedural (substantive) matters. Article 27 of the UN Charter, is the clause that gives the permanent five their veto power by stating that while decisions on procedural matters will be made by an affirmative vote of at least nine out of fifteen current members, decisions on substantive matters are made by affirmative votes of nine members, “including the concurring votes of the permanent members”. In order for a resolution to fail other than the usages of the veto power by one of the permanent five, seven countries have to vote against the resolution, abstain or be absent from the Council at the time of voting.

Competence and Responsibilities of the Security Council

Until the Cold War came to define global politics, the Council formed its role as preventing a third world war but after, the Council moved to tackle prevention of regional conflicts from turning into international disputes. Accordingly, as stated in the article 24 of the UN charter, Member States have the responsibility to maintain international peace and security and the Security Council will be the body to carry out this mission by acting on their behalf. The Council’s other responsibilities include recommending the admission of new members and the appointment of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) and together with the UNGA, electing the judges of International Court of Justice. Having these responsibilities, the Security Council can issue resolutions that are legally binding on all Member States while other organs of the UN can only make recommendations to the governments.

Resources for Further Research

Below is a list of resources that will be useful in your preparation for the committee. Overall, an understanding of current events and the powers of the UN Security Council will be the most beneficial to perform well in the committee.

  The UN Charter outlines the powers and functions of different UN bodies including the UNSC. Reviewing the Charter can allow delegates to better understand the purpose of the committee as well as the powers of the UNSC.

  The UN’s official newsroom provides up to date information on recent operations and developments of various UN agencies.

**Topic A:** Considering an Arms Embargo and other Measures to Prevent a Resurgence of Violence in South Sudan

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South Sudan came into existence in 2011 amidst huge challenges. Independence from Sudan following two devastating civil wars brought great hope to many South Sudanese. But massive state corroding corruption, political power grabs within the ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and persistent tensions with Sudan over the sharing of oil revenues left South Sudan deeply vulnerable to renewed conflict. On December 15, 2013, tensions between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar exploded into armed conflict in the country’s capital of Juba. Since then, both of these men have exploited ethnic tensions and the country’s vast natural resources for their own personal and political gain. Tens of thousands of South Sudanese have been killed and evidence of war crimes by both sides continues to mount. A shocking 40% of the entire population is facing a humanitarian catastrophe. As this senseless conflict has continued inside of a cycle of pure impunity, millions of lives are now hanging by a thread.

Ignited by a political struggle between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar that led to the Machar’s removal from as vice president, violence erupted between presidential guard soldiers in December 2013 and immediately took on an ethnic character. Soldiers from the Dinka ethnic group, one of the two largest ethnic groups in South Sudan, aligned with President Kiir and those from the Nuer ethnic group, the other largest ethnic group, supported Riek Machar. In the midst of chaos, President Kiir announced that Machar had attempted a coup and violence spread quickly to Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity states. Since the outbreak of conflict, armed groups have targeted civilians along ethnic lines, committed rape and sexual violence, destroyed property and looted villages, and recruited children into their ranks.

Violence has prevented farmers from planting or harvesting crops, causing food shortages nationwide. In July 2014, the UN Security Council declared South Sudan’s food crisis the worst in the world. It warned that some four million people—a third of South Sudan’s population—could be affected and up to fifty thousand children could...
die of hunger. The conflict in South Sudan is categorized by the UN as a "Level 3" humanitarian emergency, based on the scale, urgency, and complexity of needs.

In late December 2013, the UN Security Council authorized a rapid deployment of about 6,000 security forces, in addition to 7,600 peacekeepers already in the country, to aid in nation building efforts. In May 2014, the Security Council voted in a rare move to shift the mission’s mandate from nation building to civilian protection, authorizing UN troops to use force. Since reprioritizing protection, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan has faced extreme challenges due to the deterioration of the security situation and its complex relationship with the government of the Republic of South Sudan, which is a belligerent to the conflict.

**Historical Background of the Conflict**

*In order to understand this conflict further, the following timeline shall prove pivotal, as it will serve as a tool to trace the historical aspect of the agenda item presented.*

**First Sudanese Civil War, 1955-1972**

- **1955:** Anticipating independence and fearing domination by the north, southern insurgents stage a mutiny in Torit. These early rebels develop a large secessionist movement in the south, called the Anyanya. The Anyanya struggled with a lot of internal factionalism and instability, much like the SPLA would deal with in the second civil war.
- **1972:** All rebel factions gather under the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) to negotiate a peace agreement with the Sudanese government. The Addis Ababa Agreement is signed, granting the south considerable autonomy and a share of natural resources. A ten-year hiatus in the conflict follows.
- **1970s:** As Sudan gains legitimacy in peacetime; Western countries begin supplying the government with arms. The United States sells Sudan a great deal of equipment, hoping to counteract Soviet support of Marxist Ethiopians and Libyans.
- **1978:** Chevron finds large oil fields in the Upper Nile and southern Kordofan regions. Shortly thereafter, oil is discovered throughout Southern Sudan.
- **1980:** Khartoum attempts to redraw the boundaries of Southern Sudan, transferring oilfields to the north. When this fails, Khartoum begins taking the territory by force, including the Muglad Basin. The Muglad Basin is an area near the north-south border that was claimed by Khartoum and renamed, using the Arabic word for "unity."\(^\text{11}\)

**Second Sudanese Civil War, 1983-2005**

\(^{11}\) [http://www.waterforsouthsudan.org/brief-history-of-south-sudan/](http://www.waterforsouthsudan.org/brief-history-of-south-sudan/)
Late 1970s: Repeated violations of the Addis Ababa Agreement by the north lead to increased unrest in the south.

May 1983: Battalion 105, stationed at Bor and composed mostly of ex-Anyanya troops, is attacked after refusing to transfer to the north. Led by Kerubino Bol, the battalion flees to Ethiopia.

June 1983: The Sudanese government officially abolishes the Addis Ababa Agreement and divides the south into three regions. The southern regional government is dissolved. President Nimeiry institutes a bold Islamization campaign, transforming Sudan into a Muslim Arab state. Mutinies occur throughout the south and rebel forces grow.


September 1983: Nimeiry issues a set of decrees, known as the September Laws, imposing sharia law throughout the country. These laws include extreme punishments such as cutting off offenders' hands for stealing.

Mid-1980s: Civil war rages through the south. The SPLA battles government forces and attempts to gain control. Raids by the murahaleen — government-armed Arab militias — reach their peak. Villages throughout the south are repeatedly attacked and destroyed. Slavery becomes widespread. As villages are ransacked and survivors flee, the so-called "Lost Boys" begin their walks across Southern Sudan into Ethiopia.

Late 1980s: President Nimeiry is deposed and Sadiq al-Mahdi rises to power. Various peace negotiation attempts between al-Mahdi and the SPLA fail as the conflict worsens.

1989: As al-Mahdi moves toward signing certain peace agreements, he is ousted in a coup and Omar al-Bashir seized power. Al-Bashir is supported by the fundamentalist National Islamic Front (NIF), headed by hard-line Islamist Hassan al-Turabi. The new government fiercely enforces Islamic code throughout Sudan, banning trade unions, political parties, and other "non-religious" institutions.

1989: The Sudanese government begins deploying army militiamen notoriously known as the People's Defense Forces to raid villages in the south alongside the murahaleen.

1991: Salva and all refugees at Pinyudo are forced to leave Ethiopia when that country's dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, is overthrown. Around the same time, the Nasir faction of SPLA splits off; a second rebel faction forms in 1992, followed by a third in 1993. Eventually, the dissident rebel factions unite in a coalition called SPLA-United.


1993: A peace initiative for Sudan is pursued by Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), but has little effect. Conflict in Sudan continues to worsen.

1996: Salva is approved for resettlement in the US.

1998: After embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States launches a missile attack on a pharmaceutical factory outside Khartoum that it believes is producing chemical weapons for terrorist groups.

1999: Almost 4,000 Sudanese refugee boys are approved for resettlement to the United
2001: Famine affects three million Sudanese.

September 2001: President George Bush appoints former U.S. Senator John Danforth as the President’s Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan.

February 2003: The Darfur conflict begins.

January 9, 2005: Peace is finally brokered between southern rebels and the government of Sudan. The Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is signed, granting autonomy to the south for a six-year trial period, after which the south will have the opportunity to vote to secede. The agreement calls for a permanent ceasefire and sharing of oil revenues. Islamic law remains in effect in the north, while its use in the south is decided regionally.

August 1, 2005: John Garang dies in a helicopter crash three weeks after being sworn in as First Vice President of Sudan. Riots result, but peace continues.

Per the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a referendum is scheduled to be held in 2011 to determine if Southern Sudan will remain a part of Sudan or secedes and gains its independence. The people of Southern Sudan await their historic opportunity for peace and stability, after a twenty-one-year conflict that claimed at least two million lives. Meanwhile, in Darfur, the number of dead and displaced continues to grow, and the conflict rages on with no clear end in sight.

April, 2010: Sudan holds its first national elections in over 20 years. Key opposition parties boycott at the last minute charging election fraud. Omar Hassan al-Bashir wins Presidency of Sudan with 68% of the vote. Salva Kiir wins Presidency of the Government of Southern Sudan with 75% of the vote.

January 9th, 2011: Southern Sudanese vote in a referendum stipulated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement to decide if the region will separate from the North and become an independent nation. When results are tabulated, the vote is overwhelming for separation. A six-month period of transition begins.

July 9th, 2011: The Republic of South Sudan celebrates its birthday. On July 14, 2011 The Republic of South Sudan joined the United Nations as the world’s 193rd nation.

Humanitarian Impact of the Conflict

Thousands of civilians have been killed, often because of their ethnicity or perceived political alliances in South Sudan’s ongoing conflict. An estimated 2 million people have been forced to flee their homes. Large parts of key towns and essential civilian infrastructure such as clinics, hospitals, and schools, have been looted, destroyed, and abandoned. Tens of thousands of people are still sheltering in United Nations compounds, too afraid to return home. Lack of accountability for decades of
violence during Sudan’s long civil war helped fuel the conflict. Military and political leaders on all sides have failed to make any serious attempt to reduce abuses committed by their forces, or to hold them to account.

Since the beginning of the conflict, South Sudan’s National Security Service (NSS) and military intelligence detained hundreds of men for alleged connections with opposition forces, some for as long as a year, often in inhumane conditions. Most detainees were beaten and many tortured. None of the detainees was allowed access to a lawyer or judge. Former detainees held in the NSS Riverside detention site in Juba were held in dark, unbearably hot rooms. Detainees held by military intelligence in Eastern Equatorial and in Juba were tortured including with pliers, suffocation with a plastic bag, or jets of water directed at their faces. At least three men were victims of enforced disappearances, including two members of Lakes state parliament who were forcibly disappeared for many months after being detained in police custody before eventually being released in August 2015.

Humanitarian aid is delivered in extremely challenging circumstances, when and where possible. Violence, harassment and intimidation against humanitarian workers have already resulted in the death of 67 aid workers since December 2013 and continue to hamper the work of organizations. Moreover, humanitarian workers are faced with seizure of their assets, illegal obstructions and efforts to tax and divert relief aid. The recent fighting has provided a cover for the widespread and systematic looting
by all armed forces.\(^\text{14}\)

**Current Updates on the Issue**

In 2005, the Sudanese government and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to end the war. That deal paved the way for 2010 elections and the southern referendum, after which South Sudan, led by the SPLM, seceded in July 2011. The Sudan-South Sudan relationship remains tense, and parts of the CPA have yet to be fully implemented, including demarcation of their shared border. In 2012, South Sudan’s government, angered by Khartoum’s decisions regarding the transit and export of its oil through Sudan, and by border disputes, suspended oil production for over a year. This led to fiscal austerity measures and economic shocks in both countries (South Sudan’s GDP declined by 48% in 2012), and to clashes that threatened to reignite the war.

A handful of peace agreements have been signed over the course of the war — the most recent in August 2015 — but they have been repeatedly violated. The situation remains highly unstable. While some regions have recently become slightly less volatile, allowing people to move around fairly freely and return to their homes, violent outbreaks are still occurring throughout the country.

Most recently, a fresh wave of violence erupted in Juba starting July 2016, just one day before the country’s five-year anniversary of independence. The clashes killed more than 300 people and displaced 40,000 more over the course of a few days. On top of these attacks, the country’s economy is in crisis — the South Sudanese pound has declined in value, and the cost of goods and services has skyrocketed. The inflation rate — 835 percent — is the highest in the world. In early 2017, a famine was declared in parts of South Sudan, leaving 100,000 people on the verge of starvation.

**Possible Arms Embargo on South Sudan**

As recent as December 2016, the United Nations Security Council has failed to adopt a U.S.-drafted resolution to impose an arms embargo and further sanctions on South Sudan despite warnings by United Nations officials of a possible genocide in the world’s newest state. There were seven votes in favor and eight abstentions. A resolution needs nine votes in favor and no vetoes by the United States, France, Russia, Britain or China to be adopted. Japan, Russia, China, Angola, Malaysia, Venezuela, Egypt and Senegal all abstained.

After the failure to pass a substantive document that would impose an arms

embargo and other sanctions against South Sudan, the U.S. ambassador at the moment, Samantha Powers said: "the council members who didn't support this resolution are taking a big gamble that South Sudan's leaders will not instigate a catastrophe. It is the people of South Sudan who will pay an unbearable price. Although Ms. Powers continued to mention that the United States was prepared to push for another vote on an arms embargo in the future, the Deputy U.N. Ambassador of China, Wu Haitiao said that “there needs to be prudent actions with respect to embargoes and designations to avoid complicating the situation even further in South Sudan.”

It is undeniable that a potential resolution that would impose the necessary measures in order to cut arms sales to a state that "instead of feeding its people is amping up and arming up for an increasing ethnic conflict" would be ideal. However, it is important to consider that any such measure would have to garner the support of at least 9 Member States and without any notable veto by a P5 member. In this regard, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed that he feared genocide was about to start in South Sudan unless immediate action is taken, renewing his months-long plea for an arms embargo. Notwithstanding, South Sudan's U.N. ambassador, Akuei Bona Malwal, said such descriptions were exaggerated and did not "reflect the reality on the ground."

Challenges Ahead/Conclusion

Looking ahead, the challenges for international engagement in South Sudan are myriad. In the aftermath of the fighting in Juba in July, it is unclear how, or when, regional or international mediators may be able to bring the warring sides back together for peace talks. The government in Juba has been hostile toward proposals that suggest expanded foreign intervention may be needed to stabilize the country, and its increasingly antagonistic rhetoric toward the U.N. may, potentially, pose an increasing threat to peacekeepers, aid workers, and other expatriates in the country. By some accounts, South Sudan is on the brink of collapse, a potential “failed state.” In the view of other experts, it never fully transitioned to a state after independence. Some observers, including former U.S. Special Envoy Princeton Lyman, have suggested that it may be time to put South Sudan “on life support” by establishing “an executive mandate for the U.N. and the AU to administer the country until institutions exist to manage politics nonviolently and break up patronage networks underlying the conflict.” They argue that piecemeal technical investments, such as financial bailouts, development initiatives, or disarmament and demobilization programs, will be insufficient without an accountable and functional government in place. The reaction to
such a proposal among other African leaders—some of whom may view such an arrangement as a dangerous post-colonial precedent—is uncertain.

Many longtime South Sudan watchers view the dearth of political inclusion and government accountability, along with entrenched corruption, as root causes of the ongoing conflict. Given the Kiir government’s sensitivity to perceived threats to its sovereignty, the path to any major political restructuring in Juba is unclear. President Kiir and his supporters view him as the elected president of South Sudan (pursuant to 2010 elections held in Sudan), although the country has not held elections since independence. While some international observers have challenged the legitimacy of his government, his peers in the region have yet to publicly question his right to govern. Many foreign donors are reluctant to take policy stances (e.g., a more aggressive condemnation of the Kiir government’s practices) that could potentially threaten the ability of aid agencies to deliver life-saving relief in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. Other key global powers, such as Russia, often oppose tactics designed to diplomatically isolate problematic regimes, such as sanctions, as a matter of policy. Without robust international leadership or greater international consensus on how to address South Sudan’s continuing crisis, the situation may worsen. Given the country’s structural problems and the legacies of its divisive conflicts, South Sudan appears likely to present policy challenges for U.S. executive branch officials and Congress for years to come.

Selected Security Council Resolutions about the Sudan Crisis

16 DECEMBER 2016 S/RES/2327
This extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year and reauthorized the Regional Protection Force.

15 DECEMBER 2016 S/RES/2326
This was a one-day technical rollover of the UNMISS mandate.

12 AUGUST 2016 S/RES/2304
This resolution authorized the Regional Protection Force.

Selected Security Council Presidential Statements

7 APRIL 2016 S/PRST/2016/3
This indicated the Council’s intention to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Document Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 AUGUST 2015</td>
<td>S/PRST/2015/16</td>
<td>This welcomed Salva Kiir’s signature of the IGAD peace agreement on 26 August 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 MARCH 2015</td>
<td>S/PRST/2015/9</td>
<td>This was a presidential statement that reiterated the intent to impose sanctions, including an arms embargo or targeted measures against senior figures that have threatened South Sudan’s peace, security and stability.</td>
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</table>

**Selected Secretary-General's Reports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Document Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 NOVEMBER 2016</td>
<td>S/2016/951</td>
<td>This was an UNMISS report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 JUNE 2016</td>
<td>S/2016/552</td>
<td>This was an UNMISS report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 FEBRUARY 2016</td>
<td>S/2016/138</td>
<td>This was the report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan.</td>
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**Selected Sanctions Committee Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 NOVEMBER 2016</td>
<td>S/2016/963</td>
<td>This was the South Sudan Sanctions Committee’s mid-term report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 SEPTEMBER 2016</td>
<td>S/2016/793</td>
<td>This was a Panel of Experts report on security threats to the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 JANUARY 2016</td>
<td>S/2016/70</td>
<td>This was the final report of the South Sudan Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts.</td>
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**Selected Security Council Letters**

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 NOVEMBER 2016</td>
<td>S/2016/924</td>
<td>This was the Executive Summary of the report of the special independent investigation into the July 2016 violence in Juba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 NOVEMBER 2015</td>
<td>S/2015/903</td>
<td>This letter contained an assessment of the UN’s role in providing support for security to key infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 MARCH 2014</td>
<td>S/2014/171</td>
<td>This letter transmitted a press statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea.</td>
</tr>
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### Selected Security Council Meeting Records

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 DECEMBER 2016 S/PV.7846</td>
<td>This was a briefing by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen O’Brien.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 AUGUST 2016 S/PV.7754</td>
<td>This was the meeting at which resolution 2304 was adopted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 JULY 2016 S/PV.7737</td>
<td>This was a briefing on South Sudan.</td>
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### Selected Security Council Press Statements

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 NOVEMBER 2016 SC/12596</td>
<td>This statement called on the government of South Sudan to address increasing hate speech and ethnic violence and to promote reconciliation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 JULY 2016 SC/12441</td>
<td>Council members condemned the escalation of fighting in Juba.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 JULY 2016 SC/12440</td>
<td>On the evening of 9 July, Council members issued a press statement in which they condemned the fighting in Juba on 7-8 July and urged the transitional government to take steps to end the fighting and reduce tensions.</td>
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### Selected General Assembly Documents

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 JULY 2011 A/RES/65/308</td>
<td>This resolution admitted South Sudan as a member of the UN.</td>
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### Selected Human Rights Council Documents

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>14 DECEMBER 2016 A/HRC/S-26/L.1</td>
<td>This was a Human Rights Council resolution that condemned the ongoing violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in South Sudan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 MARCH 2016 A/HRC/RES/31/20</td>
<td>This resolution established the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan.</td>
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| 2 JULY 2015 A/HRC/RES/29/13     | This stressed the importance of an objective assessment of the human rights situation in South Sudan and called for the deployment of a mission “to monitor and
report on the situation of human rights and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of allegations of violations and abuses of human rights with a view of ensuring accountability and in complementarity with the African Union Commission of Inquiry.”

Selected Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict Documents

12 MAY 2015 S/AC.51/2015/1 This was a the Working Group’s conclusion on South Sudan.

Selected Other Documents

20 DECEMBER 2016 S/2016/1085 This was the draft resolution on an arms embargo and targeted sanctions that failed to receive the necessary support to be adopted. It received seven affirmative votes (France, New Zealand, Spain, Ukraine, Uruguay, the UK and the US) and eight abstentions (Angola, China, Egypt, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Senegal, and Venezuela).

Past UN Actions

The civil war, which started in December 2013, changed the dynamics of the engagement of the UN and other development partners. With the setbacks for development following the conflict, the country was returned to rely on humanitarian assistance. In order to address the current context of the country, the United Nations Country Team has adopted a short-term development strategy that will guide the delivery of support during the interim period between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2017, which also corresponds, to the transitional period under the peace period.

The Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) provides a basis for for the UN to work with the government, and other development partners to
address key challenges and issues, as South Sudan works towards achieving sustainable peace and development. It will be followed by an UNDAF based on the Sustainable Development Goals, once a national development plan is in place.\(^\text{15}\)


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**Foreign Interests Fueling the Conflict**

In 2015, the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan documented the presence of large amounts of sophisticated weaponry on both sides, many of them originating from abroad and which continue to fuel the conflict today.\(^\text{16}\)

- **Ukraine:** During the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) interim period, Ukraine became the most prolific exporter of small arms, light weapons, tanks and other large conventional weapons to South Sudan. Ukrainian heavy machine guns and grenade launchers were found in 2014, even after the start of the civil war. These weapons, authorized by Ukrainian state arms exporter, Ukrspetsexport, reached South Sudan through Kenya and Uganda.

- **China:** China is one of the biggest buyers of South Sudanese oil. It is also one of the biggest exporters of arms to Sub-Saharan Africa and the third largest arms exporter in the world, behind the US and Russia. Due to its discount prices and its pledge of full cooperation with South Sudan, China’s arms exports have increased significantly. The UN report notes that the South Sudanese government purchased USD 20 million in weapons from the Chinese state-owned weapons manufacturer, China North Industries Corp. (Norinco), in 2014. Many of these weapons went on to be used by the rebels through re-selling, capture, or re-distribution. *While China stopped selling arms following its last shipment in July 2014, its weapons still play a prominent role in South Sudan’s*

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conflict.

- **Russia**: As recently as 2012, Russia sided with China in resisting Western efforts to sanction the Sudan’s (North and South) over the escalating conflict between the two countries. Like China, Russia is interested in lucrative deals with the energy-rich states. As a result, Russia explicitly expressed its interest in enhancing military trade relations with South Sudan. In October 2011, a delegation from the Russian Federal State Unitary Enterprise, Rosoboronexport, met with the President Salva Kiir to discuss military cooperation. The Deputy Director-General of Rosoboronexport, Alexander Micheev, then stated that Russia was prepared to increase support for building South Sudan’s defense capacity. Since then, Russia has become a significant arms supplier to South Sudan.

- **Sudan & Iran**: Some of the weapons on the rebel side, opposing South Sudanese President Salva Kiir, have been traced back to Sudan, with markings indicating that they were manufactured in Sudan as recently as 2014, a year after the civil war in South Sudan broke out. According to the Small Arms Survey, close military ties between Iran and Sudan also explains why many weapons of Iranian origin were found in South Sudan. The tight relationship between Khartoum and Tehran has resulted in Iran becoming the second biggest arms exporter to Sudan. These weapons have been reaching South Sudan through its northern border with the Republic of Sudan’s. Iranian weapons were first discovered in 2011 and 2012 in Jonglei and Unity States within David Yau Yau’s rebel group and anti-government SPLA, suggesting that the Iranian arms were part of Khartoum’s efforts to either derail or handicap the ongoing peace processes. There is no definite evidence that the countries themselves were implicated in direct arms sales since illicit arms trade is widespread in the region.

- **Canada**: Evidence shows that between 2012 and 2014, the SPLA procured 20 ‘Cougar’ and 30 ‘Typhoon’ type Armed Personnel Carriers (APCs) manufactured in the United Arab Emirates production facilities of the Canadian-owned manufacturer, Streit Group. Both the Cougar and Typhoon APCs were subsequently observed in different locations within South Sudan between May and December 2014, including in areas of Unity State where the conflict has been intense.

- **Former Soviet-Bloc countries**: Weapons manufactured in Eastern European
countries, such as Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, and the former Soviet Union, are also very common among armed groups throughout South Sudan.

- **South Africa**: South African armored vehicles were sold to South Sudan in 2012 and 2013.

- **Israel**: According to the UN Report and based on photographic evidence of automatic rifles made by Israel Military Industries (IMI), Israeli weapons are being used by South Sudan’s army and police and are fuelling the war. Despite the evidence, Israel denies any official arms trade.

- **Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda (transit countries)**: Several regional countries have often been used as routes for arms transfers. Evidence shows that Kenya colluded with Ukraine to keep its arms transfers covert. In addition to Kenya, other countries have played important active or supporting roles in bringing arms into South Sudan. For example, Ethiopia has been a significant covert source of weapons for the SPLA. In 2008, Ethiopia reportedly supplied four shipments of military equipment within a six-month period. Uganda has also served as an overland transit point for arms deliveries.

**Key Questions a Potential Resolution Should Address**

1. How can the United Nations most effectively facilitate an end to violence and a path toward peace and reconciliation, both among political factions and rival communities?

2. Is the August 2015 peace agreement still viable? Should peace negotiations be restarted? Is the government in Juba still, in practice, a unity government?

3. In 2015, U.N. human rights monitors described violence in the parts of the country as demonstrating a “new brutality and intensity”, In this regard, how can the UN contribute towards ameliorating and finally ending this bloody conflict?

4. Given the gravity of the abuses committed during the conflict and the shortcomings of South Sudan’s criminal justice system, the 2015 peace deal included the creation of a hybrid court. How is this hybrid court, if implemented, deal with Senior Officials? How effective would it be?
5. What lessons have been learned from past support for state-building efforts in South Sudan, and how can foreign donors best support more transparent, inclusive, and accountable governance going forward?

6. Several organizations have comprehensively concluded that the recurrent violence has its roots in the failed 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement; specifically, the Commission suggested that the international community was preoccupied with ending the north-south violence and as a result paid little attention to democracy and structural transformation. What further steps need to be taken in order to ensure that any peacekeeping or peace building efforts ensure and safeguard the country and prevent any relapse into conflict?

7. How, or when, regional or international mediators may be able to bring the warring sides back together for peace talks?

8. How effective can foreign intervention be? Especially considering the antagonistic rhetoric toward the U.N and how is may potentially pose an increasing threat to peacekeepers, aid workers, and other expatriates in the country.

9. How sufficient would be technical investments, such as financial bailouts, development initiatives, or disarmament and demobilization programs?

10. Is this the case of a “failed state”? Is it possible to issue an executive mandate for the U.N. and the AU to administer the country until institutions exist to manage politics nonviolently and break up patronage networks underlying the conflict?

11. What are the international community’s expectations of peacekeepers with regard to protecting civilians, and do they have the appropriate personnel, equipment, and political will to implement their mandate?

12. If fighting continues, what possible steps—further sanctions, an arms embargo, new types of aid, aid restrictions—would be most appropriate and most effective?

13. How can the United Nations support efforts to pursue accountability for alleged war crimes without a negative impact on the peace process?
14. How can the International Community support South Sudan’s development and meet the massive humanitarian needs of the war raged country?

15. Some key global powers, such as Russia, often oppose tactics designed to diplomatically isolate problematic regimes, such as sanctions, as a matter of policy. How can the International Community unite in order secure a prosperous future for the people of South Sudan?

16. Given the serious abuses committed by the parties involved in the conflict, what role, if any, should the United Nations play and how should it engage with senior officials who have been accused of directing military operations in which war crimes have reportedly been committed?

17. How can the international community help to create a more secure environment for aid workers and UN peacekeepers?
**Topic B**: Addressing the Proliferation of Armed Militias in Destabilized Countries

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Introduction

In accordance with the Oxford Dictionary of English, and in order to better understand the subject at hand, a militia is described as “a military force that is raised from the civil population to supplement a regular army in an emergency”. In addition, it is well documented that militias “engage in rebel or terrorist activities in opposition to a regular army”. Incapable to hold ground against properly trained and equipped professional armed forces, it is common for militias to engage in “guerrilla warfare” or defense instead of being used in open attacks and offense. Militias can be either military, or paramilitary, depending on the particular instance.

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which brought to a close the religious wars in Europe, marked the beginnings of the modern state, a territorial entity in which the governed and the governing form a compact of reciprocal rights and obligations. This social compact, in whatever form it assumed, was reinforced in the 19th century by the concept of the "volk," in which the governed identify themselves as the state rather than a mere party to an agreement. This psychological fusion of governed with governing and the institutions of governance we call nationalism.

These developments took place at the same time that the Europeans were exploring and then intensively colonizing America, Asia, and Africa, often with no regard for the political structures and historic arrangements of these areas. In the 20th century, from the 1930’s to 1991, the great powers were engaged in ideological struggles that strengthened nationalism within opposing nations and gave rise to competition for influence in countries in what was viewed as a game for world dominance. These struggles emphasized the political-military arena, with the presumption that the best way to influence political leanings and gain diplomatic support was to provide military hardware and pledges of military support against enemies. Thus, in essence, giving rise to Armed Militias and their recurrent proliferation throughout the world, with special emphasis in those countries whom were destabilized at the time and lacked a proper leadership (political structure), economic structure and overall social cohesion. In the context of the late 20th century, a destabilized state is one in which the rulers either break the underlying compact by neglecting or ignoring fundamental freedoms to their people or, as illustrated most graphically in Rwanda in 1994, actually direct the state against, and encourage one segment of the population to hunt down another one.

In turn what this produces is further instability and a prosperous scenario for
armed conflict. When referring to Armed Militias, the crucial component are the armaments that are either stolen or seized from stocks already within the country, and which exacerbate the conflict itself. Most often the arms of choice, which in turn are cheap, plentiful, easily transported and used, and require low maintenance, are small arms, light weapons, and explosives (SALW). The plentiful supply of such weapons, which continue to be churned out by 50 nations today, is what has emerged as the "conventional weapons of mass destruction."

The root problem, when analyzing the rapid increase and diffusion of armed militias, is the lack of responsibility among the governing group to fulfill the state's part of the social contract. Yet without any question, it is the availability and presence of small arms which translates the landscape of struggle from the political to the military realm, creating humanitarian catastrophes that involve huge population shifts, long term agricultural insufficiency and general economic collapse, and civil population decimation from disease, starvation, and direct conflict.

Although a few decades ago arms sales to failed or fragile states were often covert, the reality today is that, powerful arms producing nations continue to sell arms unabated. The recycling of such weapons often takes place via the intricate black market. Weapons are smuggled from one hot zone to another. Although we have come accustomed to images that portray high priced fighter jets and battle tanks rumbling through the streets of desolate cities, it is in fact small arms and light weapons that are now wreaking the most havoc around the world. Small arms and light weapons are the weapons of choice of armed militias and are considered by many, the real weapons of mass destruction.

**Armed Militias and the Role of Small Arms and Light Weapons**

Absent from this array of new threats to individual, national, and international security is a major weapons category that numerous global leaders scarcely mention but, which affects profoundly every level of human security in present day. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are perhaps the most deadly of all weapons because they are indeed very insidious. With them, a small group can easily turn a peaceful country or region into a major zone of conflict and man-made humanitarian disaster. Small arms rend the fabric of civil society like no other weapon in the world. SALW cause strife, war, destruction, death, humanitarian crises, refugees, and further deterioration.

What kinds of weapons do we refer to as "small arms and light weapons"? Small arms and light weapons include any weapon that can be carried by one or two
people, or mounted on a vehicle. They are easily available, lightweight, and relatively inexpensive. These tools of death and violence include traditional military style weapons, but also others such as machetes, axes, swords, and similar weapons.

The term "small arms" often is used to describe three major subdivisions of weaponry: small arms, light weapons, and ammunition and explosives. A recent United Nations report provided the following definitions: small arms includes revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns; light weapons includes heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles (sometimes mounted), portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems (sometimes mounted), and mortars of calibers less than 100 mm; ammunition and explosives includes cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades, landmines and explosives.

Armed Militias are constantly inclined to utilize, in most cases, SALW due to the fact that they are attractive because of their low cost and wide availability, lethality, simplicity and durability, portability and conceivability, and military, police, and civilian uses. Another insidious characteristic of small arms is their persistence, as they often remain rampant whenever organized conflict ends. Thus, in turn, preventing peace building from being effecting. SALW can become instruments for other forms of violence such as criminal behavior, disruption of development assistance, and interference with efforts to deliver food, medicine, and supplies to people in dire need of relief.

The United Nations believes that small arms and light weapons are responsible for about 90% of all war casualties since World War II. SALW are being used increasingly in intra-state conflicts because their cost, portability and easy availability make them particularly suitable for both governments and non-state actors fighting low-intensity conflicts. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in various parts of the globe continues to pose a systemic and pervasive threat to the long-term social and economic development of many nations, particularly in small developing states. The unregulated and continuous flow of weapons can have a grave effect not only the country in crisis, but also neighboring countries in the region. The ample supply of weapons that often pour across borders can very quickly destabilize a fragile region. This provokes a virtual culture of violence that traps whole societies in an
endless cycle of war and bloodshed.

The Small Arms Trade

Small arms, often included under the rubric of conventional weapons, are not usually included in the reporting of conventional arm sales. Further, because a large portion of the trade in small arms is done via commercial transactions by private industry and not government sales, small arms deals do not undergo the same level of scrutiny as other weapon systems that require government approval or oversight. Therefore, the transfer and recycling of small arms and light weapons from conflict to conflict can easily become part of a complex combination of legal and illicit transfers.

According to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the small arms trade is estimated at 13% of all arms transfers. ACDA. Experts believe that the total trade in small arms could be as high as $10 billion.  

Legal and Illicit Trade of SALW

The legal trade in small arms takes shape as either a government-to-government transfer, an industry-to-government transfer, or a government or industry-to-sanctioned arms dealer or to legitimate militias and paramilitary organizations.

Complicating matters in the legal small arms trade is that the number of small arms manufacturers has increased dramatically in the past 10 years; some estimates are as high as 300 manufacturers in 50 countries, a 25% increase in 10 years. Experts also believe that up to one-third of the small arms trade takes place through illicit channels. If the global trade in small arms is approximately $10 billion. Like other items on the black market, small arms follow typical patterns of smuggling and source. Small arms can be stolen from stocks, diverted to unintended third parties, or sold through illicit channels. Some of these illicit arms dealings include:

- Black-market sales to governments and to insurgent and separatist forces;
- Theft of government and privately owned arms by insurgent and criminal forces;
- Exchanges between insurgent and criminal organizations in order to gain profit

or in pursuit of similar political objectives.

**Efforts by the International Community**

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) constitute an entire class of weapons that have been consistently disregarded by governments and policy makers. There is no universal treaty, or international standard applicable for that matter, in regards to small arms; Notwithstanding, as the realization grows of the detrimental effects of small arms and light weapons on all aspects of individual, national, regional and international peace and security, policy makers have begun several initiatives that attempt to control small arms at the regional and international level.

**Initiatives by the United Nations**

Since 1995, several resolutions focusing on small arms have been introduced in the UN General Assembly. These have been directed primarily on collecting and destroying small arms and on harmonizing export policies. Most notably, however, was a resolution that called for the creation of a UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. The panel issued a report in August, 1997 that described the causes for the proliferation of small arms; provided a definition of small arms; documented, using regional examples, the effects of small arms; and made policy recommendations for the United Nations and international community. This report has become the standard for discussing small arms and light weapons in the international community. The panel also made notable recommendations about the proliferation of militias and included disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants, strengthening international and regional cooperation in dealing with small arms, and supporting collection and disposal programs for surplus weapons, as a means to prevent the escalation of conflict.

There has also been talk of expanding the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which currently has seven categories of heavy conventional weapons, to include small arms and light weapons. Reactions toward efforts to expand the Register have been mixed and have been blocked by several countries, and to this day no action has been taken.

**Initiatives by the Organization of American States (OEA)**

Two of the largest problems in the Americas are the multitude of weapons left over from years of civil war in Central and South America and the influx of guns into
drug producing and trafficking regions (the smuggling routes of illegal weapons often follow well established illicit drug routes).

**Initiatives by West African Moratorium**

The entire West African region has been wracked by civil wars, rebel insurgencies, and above all the massive proliferation of small arms. To combat these problems, the heads of the sixteen members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed on October 31, 1998 a renewable three-year moratorium on the production, import, and export of light weapons. The Moratorium, absent enforcement provisions, took effect November 1, 1998. The historic West Africa enterprise was developed under the initiative of the President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare, in December 1996. After Mali successfully concluded a peace agreement within its own country, surplus weapons were burned in a symbolic "Flame of Peace" ceremony.

**Initiatives begun by Civil Society**

Governments are falling behind initiatives being proposed by concerned groups in civil society. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are leading the charge and creating momentum on the small arms issue. They are working in post-conflict societies to collect surplus weapons and destroy them. NGOs are developing rehabilitation programs for ex-combatants. In some countries, such as South Africa, NGOs are working directly with governments to develop new laws that regulate small arms and light weapons.

In an attempt to capture and work upon the momentum established by NGOs, working separately in various parts of the world, a new mechanism has been established to facilitate communication and cooperation among NGOs working on the small arms issue. The Preparatory Committee for a Global Campaign on Small Arms and Light Weapons (Prep Com) is an Internet community of NGOs and individuals dedicated to preparing a global campaign to “alleviate the carnage caused by the proliferation, accumulation, and misuse of small arms and light weapons."

**The Impact of Armed Militias to Society**

Whether they control territory, supply members and constituencies with services or are embedded within the wider society, militias are capable of endangering the lives
of communities. They may do this by hindering humanitarian aid, planting landmines, recruiting and using child soldiers and by trafficking and misusing small arms and light weapons (SALW). Violent acts, paired with an increased presence of international and transnational actors in internal armed conflicts, have made humanitarian engagement nearly impossible.

**Approaches to Improve Civilian Protection**

The existence of Armed militias, with or without defined political agendas, is not just a contemporary phenomenon, but activities by armed groups were described as early as the fifteenth century B.C. In general, because of their importance for the initiation and continuation of armed conflict, Non-State Actors (NSAs) have always, to some extent, been the topic of study. Nevertheless, the perception of these groups and how they should be approached has changed. For example, with the increasing acceptance of human rights, activists have become more vocal about disrespect for these laws.

Some non-military approaches for making Armed Non-State Actors responsible are:

- **Inclusive approaches:** dialogue/negotiation and dissemination, training/capacity building, intermediation (between conflict parties) and direct services.
- **Coercive approaches:** denunciation/‘naming and shaming,’ sanctions, individual criminal prosecution and ‘terrorist listing.’

The different inclusive approaches focus on understanding and involving NSAs, and trying to foster a sense of ownership of humanitarian norms within them. They provide NSAs with a possibility to develop and take on different commitments, as well as sensitive, train and monitor them. The principal aim of these approaches is to provide better protection to civilians, through encouraging NSAs to take on responsibilities towards them. The different approaches can either reinforce or work against each other, mainly depending on the reaction of the NSAs to the coercive approaches.

An exhaustive study of peace implementation following agreements in 16 civil wars (1980-1997) has found that cases of peace implementation differ dramatically in terms of:

(a) the difficulty of the implementation environment and of
(b) the willingness of international actors to provide resources and risk troops.

The environment must be sufficiently benign to conclude a peace agreement and to build peace. The three most important sources of failure, these are:

1) the presence of spoilers – factions or leaders who oppose the peace
agreement and use violence to undermine it;
2) neighboring states that oppose the agreement and assist the spoilers; and;
3) the presence of easily marketable valuable commodities like timber and gems (spoils). However, if internal and external factors do not fully converge in favor of peace, there may still be a settlement if there is sustained third party involvement.

In the Sudan, the extent of damage and neglect of physical infrastructure invites employment-intensive reconstruction with maximum local inputs. It has been known that a core issue fuelling the civil wars has been the failure of state structures to accommodate the conflicting demands on them by rival groups. Experiences from elsewhere in the Horn of Africa also indicate that it will be a challenging task to transform the SPLA from being a guerrilla movement to a political party complying with principles of democratic governance.

While democracy cannot be easily designed and structured, particularly not by outsiders, it is important to highlight that there is still considerable potential for constructive institutional design, policy choice, and changes to the culture of politics, which can make democracy more responsive to problems of inequality and conflict. What matters most, however, is the overall commitment to political and social inclusion, rather than the political formulas by which it is brought about. This is a major challenge in the Sudan.

**Conclusion**

It is without any minor doubt, that Armed Militias pose a serious threat to national, regional and international peace and security. Armed militias usually prefer SALWs to carry out atrocities and further fuel the strife which endangers the innocent civilians, government infrastructure exacerbate the humanitarian crises, and the legitimacy of democracies. In order to prevent the continuous spread of SALWs it is important to evaluate two primary possible courses of action. The first is to gain control of the vast stocks of small arms and light weapons in the world. Initially, this requires a system of transparency in which quantities, types, and locations of weapons are publically identified. Admittedly, this is a monumental task and, with over twenty significant conflicts still raging in the world, one that will remain incomplete for a number of years. In conjunction with this process, nations should develop processes by which their manufacture or purchase of new weapons is offset by the destruction - not the transfer - of old weapons. Second, the concept of sovereignty, which is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, must be modified. Interventions
sanctioned by the UN Security Council have become relatively common in the last decade, even if they have occurred generally after one or more rounds of civil war. This remains a very delicate diplomatic area, but until the world community decides that it can intervene before states fail, it will forever be forced into more costly reactions to events.

**Key Questions a Potential Resolution Should Address**

1. What are the sources of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW)?

2. Why are armed militias a recurrent danger in countries in conflict and what is the role of the UN and other regional and international organizations in this regard?

3. How do weapons-producing nations contribute to the fueling of conflict and the proliferation of Armed Militias throughout the Horn of Africa?

4. What necessary components of the weapons could be most easily traced and potentially regulated by the International community?

5. How should the UN access possible sanctions for the production, distribution and dissemination of SALW’s throughout volatile nations that are undergoing decades-long civil wars and where strife is rampant?

6. How should nations address illegal arms already present within one’s borders, but not in the possession of destabilizing entities?

7. How should the issue of the armament of militias be addressed in order to safeguard regional and international peace and security?

8. Where does the illicit arms trade and transport take place physically? Can the United Nations crack down on these choke points?
Helpful Sources of Information

- UNODA’s summary of relevant small arms topics:  

- An interpretation of the Arms Trade Treaty by the Arms Control Association, a U.S. nonpartisan group:  
  [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms_trade_treaty](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms_trade_treaty)

- The 2005 report, cited previously, by the General Assembly on SALW:  

- Statistics compiled by the Federation of American Scientists on arms sales:  

- Small Arms Survey:  

Suggested Reading

**Revising the UN Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan - Maintaining Focus on the Protection of Civilians**  
By: Lisa Sharland and Aditi Gorur  

**Question & Answer: The call for an arms embargo against South Sudan**  
By: Geoffrey L. Duke, Secretariat Team Leader at South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) and Elizabeth Ashamu Deng, South Sudan researcher at Amnesty International  

**Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead**  
By: Lauren Ploch Blanchard Specialist in African Affairs  
[https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43344.pdf](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43344.pdf)

**Negotiating an End to the Current Civil War in South Sudan**
By: Jok Madut Jok

**A Report OF Analysis on Armed Crimes in East Africa Community Countries**
By: Regional Centre of Small Arms

**The Crisis in North Africa Implications for Europe and Options for EU Policymakers**
By: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Nathaniel Barr, George Willcoxon and Norhan Basuni

**Security Council Adopts First-ever Resolution Dedicated to Question of Small Arms, Light Weapons**
By: Security Council, 7036th Meeting (PM)

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**Works Cited**

